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ABSTRACT 
To increase Navy Nurse Corps manpower management efficiency, we developed a Markov 
model of the personnel flow of junior officers (O1-O4).  The Nurse Corps manages personnel 
primarily through the recruitment process, drawing on multiple accession sources.  Accession 
sources were shown to have a statistically significant effect on promotion and retention rates.  
However, these effects were not found to be practically significant in the Markov model. Only 
small improvements in rank imbalances are possible given current recruiting guidelines.  
Allowing greater flexibility in recruiting practices, fewer recruits would generate a 25% 
reduction in rank imbalances, but result in understaffing.  Recruiting different ranks at entry 
would generate a 65% reduction in rank imbalances without understaffing issues.   Policies 
adjusting promotion and retention rates are more powerful in controlling personnel flows and 
are the only means for addressing the fundamental sources of rank imbalances in the Navy 
Nurse Corps arising from current manpower guidelines.  
 
 
Word count:  149
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Navy Nurse Corps (NC) is part of a team of professionals that provides high 
quality, economical health care to approximately 700,000 active duty Navy and Marine Corps 
members, as well as 2.6 million retired and family members [1].  Managing its resources more 
efficiently continues to be a high priority for the Nurse Corps and for the Department of 
Defense (DOD) in general.  In 2002, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) released “Sea 
Power 21”, a design to create a leaner, more effective Navy [2].   In response to this and prior 
directives, the Navy Nurse Corps has been making reductions in its officer configuration.  As a 
result of a recent study to define the most efficient and effective mix of manpower readiness 
requirements, 115 Nurse Corps billets have been targeted for conversion to GS employees 
starting in FY06 [3].  Manpower planning is essential to ensuring that the Nurse Corps 
continues to be able to perform its vital services. 
The use of Markov models in manpower planning is well established in the literature in 
general [4-9] as well as in the military [10-16].  Published models are available for the Marine 
Corps enlisted and officer forces [17,18] as well as for the US Army Reserves [19].  Recently a 
prototype model was developed for the NC [20] but was not comprehensive.  Other than 
historical trends, there currently is no formal model upon which gain and loss predictions are 
based [email from CAPT Buda; received 9/28/04]. 
The community manager for the Nurse Corps develops an annual accession plan that 
determines the recruiting goals, based on guidance from the Chief of Naval Personnel. New 
Nurse Corps Officers may enter through six different accession sources, described in Table 1.  
Two other long-running accession sources have been discontinued.  The Nurse corps considers 
MECP, ROTC, NCP, and STA-21 “pipeline programs”. Two remaining accession sources, 
recall and direct accessions, are used as ‘valves’ to ensure targeted manpower levels are met, 
leveling out yearly inconsistencies from the pipeline programs. 
Past research has compared the impact of accession source on an individual’s 
willingness to stay beyond his or her initial obligation [21-24] as well as conducted 
comparisons of the costs of different accessions sources [25]. It is not clear, however, whether 
these accession sources can be used in the manpower planning process to mitigate imbalances 
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seen in the officer ranks - both overages (too many in a given rank) and underages (too few in 
a given rank). 
With the challenges of personnel draw-down and conversion of some military positions 
to civilian positions, it is important to assess personnel planning and end strength 
systematically within the NC.  To this end, we developed a Markov model of the Navy Nurse 
Corps, identifying probabilities of promotion and retention from historical data, and exploring 
the impact of the different accession sources available to the NC.  Statistical analyses were 
conducted to determine points in a military career where the accession source was a 
statistically significant factor in either the promotion or the retention of an officer.  Once 
identified, the the Markov model was adjusted for that accession source, thereby allowing 




The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Manpower Information System (BUMIS) is an 
automated personnel information system maintained by the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and 
Surgery (BUMED) .  Started in 1990, BUMIS is being built gradually with new entries being 
added every year. As of 2001, 2,236 nurses (of a total end strength of just over 3,000) have 
been entered into the database. Once entered into the database, a nurse is followed until 
discharge from the NC.  Due to its construction, there are no Captains (O-6s) in the database 
and only a small number of Commanders (O-5).  Therefore, we limit our model to Lieutenant 
Commanders (O-4) whose career progression is captured within the database.  The Defense 
Manpower Data Center’S (DMDC) officer personnel records containing extensive 
demographic data [26] and BUMIS were merged to produce a combined data base (CDB) 
tracking nurse accessions for the years 1990 through 2001.      
The civilian unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics was added to the 
combined data set as a proxy for an individual’s ability to find a non-nursing job civilian job.  
A variable identifying a nurse as having one of six subspecialties considered “critical” to the 
Nurse Corps during times of increased operational commitments (Medical/Surgical Nurse, 
Psychiatric Nurse, Emergency / Trauma Nurse, Perioperative Nurse, Critical Care Nurse, and 
 5
Nurse Anesthetist) [27] was also constructed and , additionally, a “time in rank” variable was 
created so it could be determined how long an individual remained in a given rank before being 
promoted or leaving the service.  Ranks in the model included: Ensign (ENS) (O-1), Lieutenant 
Junior Grade (LTJG) (O-2),  Lieutenant (LT) (O-3), and Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) (O-
4).  
 
2.2 Statistical Analysis 
Logistic regression has been used in numerous studies to identify important influences 
on military retention and promotion.   Characteristics examined have included demographic 
variables such as age, race, gender, and family status, as well as military background and job 
characteristics such as accession source and occupational specialty, and also external market 
conditions such as the civilian unemployment rate. While nurse-specific studies have found 
demographic factors to influence an individual nurse’s likelihood of retention [21,24,25,28,29], 
accession source has also been found to be significant in determining nurse retention [21,25].  
Studies of officer promotion (not nurse-specific) have shown a similar pattern, with accession 
source consistently identified as a significant influence on promotion [30-32].  
This study uses two sets of multivariate logistical regression models to evaluate the role 
of accession sources in an individual’s leaving the service and in being promoted within a 
career path.  The binary dependent variables used in each set of the logistic regressions were 
Leave and Promote, respectively.  The set of explanatory variables used for both sets of 
regressions included:  seven accession sources (NROTC as the base case and STA-21 not 
included, as it is too new), age at entry (Entry Age), race (White), sex (Male), marital status 
(Married), number of dependents (Dependents), members with active duty spouses (ActiveSP), 
advanced educational levels of masters and diploma degrees (Master, Diploma,), the national 
unemployment rate (Unemp), and having a critical specialty (Critical).  Accession source is the 
focus while all other variables are included as control factors because the Nurse Corps can 
exert direct and immediate control on its recruiting through the accession sources but cannot 
control many of the other factors that have been found to be significant predictors in prior 
studies. 
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  Not all rank/time in rank categories contained sufficient observations for statistical 
analysis. We were only able to perform ten regressions: 3rd year Lieutenant Junior Grades 
leaving, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th year Lieutenants leaving, 2nd and 3rd year Ensigns promoting, 2nd 
and 3rd year Lieutenant Junior Grades, and 6th year Lieutenants promoting. 
 
2.3 Markov Model Construction 
Eight different Markov models were created in Microsoft Excel ™, one for each 
accession source listed in Table 1.  Individuals enter the model through the accession sources 
and progress along their career paths according to the Markov calculations. Existing forces 
continue along their career paths as well.  Each year, a summary overview of the entire nursing 
force is calculated by combining the summary status data from each individual model. 
To calculate yearly transition probabilities, the historical career progressions of all 
individuals in the CDB were identified.  Using this data, the percentage of people staying, 
promoting, and leaving from each rank/years in rank combination were calculated for the entire 
force.  For accession sources in rank/years in rank combinations found to be significant by the 
regressions, the probabilities were recalculated using only individuals from the given accession 
source.    
The combined database used in this study is not complete as approximately 1,000 
nurses have not yet been entered into the BUMIS dataset. The accession source and the time in 
rank of these ~1,000 individuals are unknown.  Therefore, to include the already existing 
nursing force in the model, it is necessary to approximate the starting distribution of 
individuals by accession source and rank/years in rank combination.  To assign accession 
source to individuals of a given rank, the average of the historical data of the last 5 years of the 
combined database was used (Table 2).   
In addition to the average distribution by accession source, a distribution by years in 
rank is also required.  This was computed using the averages from 1997-2001 in the combined 
dataset and is available from the corresponding author.  In order to obtain the distribution of 
existing nurses in the NC at any given year, these percentages are multiplied by the known 
total number of individuals in each rank. 
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New entrants enter the model through the accession sources.  Due to its recent 
inception, STA-21 does not have any individuals in the database.  It was assumed that the 
transition probabilities would most likely mirror those of MCEP, the other enlisted-to-officer 
training program.  Additionally, not all new accessions enter the Nurse Corps as Ensigns.  
Some NCP, Direct Accessions, and all Recalls enter at a higher rank.  The rank distribution of 




3.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 The age at entry into the nurse corps has been relatively constant (between 22 and 26 
years) throughout the time horizon. The racial composition (> 98% White) has remained 
unchanged and the percentage of male nurses (30%) has also remained relatively unchanged 
over the time horizon.  The percentage of individuals that are married has remained relatively 
constant between 50-60% since 1993, as have the number of dependents (between 2-2.5).   
3.2  Regression Results 
Table 4 summarizes all of the significant explanatory variables for the ten regressions.  For 
each regression, a test of the full model against a constant-only model produced a likelihood 
ratio chi-square statistic THAT was statistically significant (p<0.01), indicating that the 
explanatory variables, as a set, reliably distinguished between stayers and leavers or between 
those promoted and those not promoted.  The models correctly classified between 56% and 
91% of the observations.   
Overall, accession source does appear to have a significant impact on the probability of 
a person leaving as well as on the probability of promotion. At least one accession source was 
significant in each retention model and the same was true for all promotion models except the 
6th Year LT model.    While a number of the other explanatory variables were also significant, 
these exogenous variables are likely to remain relatively constant over the time horizon under 
consideration and are not influenced by nurse manpower planners.  
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3.3  Results of Markov Model  
Before examining the results of the model, it was necessary to validate model accuracy against 
historical data. 
3.3.1 Model Validation 
Model accuracy was assessed using FY01 through FY04 information provided by the 
Nurse Corps Community Managers office.  Starting with FY01 data, the model results were 
compared against FY02 actual data.  Next, FY02 data were input into the model and results 
were compared to FY03 data.  Averaged over the three year period, the model over predicted 
personnel by 1.4 percent.  Table 5 details the results by rank and year.   
3.3.2 Baseline Results 
BUMED supplied target end strength numbers for 2005 through 2009.  Using these 
numbers we were able to compute the imbalances, the sum of the overages and underages, 
created between the model estimates and the desired targets for the next four years starting 
from our base year, 2005.  Given the end strength numbers from 2005 and running the model 
without adding any new recruits, Lieutenants experience an overage for the next 3 years.  In 
2006, 2007, and 2008, the model predicts that there will be 91, 79, and 41 more LTs than 
targeted, respectively.  Therefore, bringing in new recruits will increase this excess.  
Adding in the currently planned accession rate of 250 new recruits per year, underages 
were observed in the ranks of LTJG and LCDR.  LTJG experiences the greatest underages, 
ranging between 60 and 130 too few individuals given the end strength targets.  LCDR 
experiences underages between 27 to 52 individuals.  Overages in the other two ranks (ENS 
and LT) are very large.  ENS has 70 individuals over target in 2006 which increases to 214 
individuals over target in 2009.  LTs experience declining overages over time, from 105 excess 
individuals in 2006 declining to 32 excess individuals in 2009.  In summary, the system 
currently is expected to face an imbalance of approximately 1,500 positions.  Using the model, 
we explored whether it was possible to lower this imbalance using different accession sources.   
To help run these analyses, Solver, a part of a suite of commands in EXCEL, was 
implemented.  Solver results were not optimal since the model programming was not done to 
ensure linearity and precision was set to .001 with a 5% tolerance.  In addition, the NC 
community manager does not have unrestricted ability to alter the use of accession sources.  
 9
Therefore, constraints were added allowing 10% flexibility in the system and ensuring that 
MECP must account for at least 13% of the new recruits, ROTC at least 15%, NPC at least 
21%, Direct Accession with bonus and without bonus must each account for at least 15%, Sta-
21 at least 6%, and Recall at least 5%.   These figures are based on historical distributions of 
new entrants from 1997-2001 [email from CAPT Bellas; received 10/03/04].   
 
3.3.3 Alternative Solutions 
A number of alternative solutions were examined in order to determine if it were 
possible to lessen the total imbalance (both overages and underages) seen in the ranks.  Table 6 
summarizes the results.  Given that the Navy NC is currently planning on bringing in 250 new 
recruits each year for the next five years, we first looked for improvements constraining the 
model to exactly 250 new recruits (Option #1, Table 6).  By using a slightly different mix of 
accession sources, the overall imbalance was reduced by 30 positions.  At least 8 different 
possible solutions were identified at this level allowing the community manager a great deal of 
flexibility in choosing recruitment goals.  This flexibility is important as frequently there are 
unstated objectives, reflecting unstated needs, preferences or political influences. 
Examining these results, ENS overages grew steadily, attaining more than 200 excess 
individuals by 2009.  LTs started with an overage of over 100 positions but declined over time, 
frequently disappearing after 2008.  More importantly, LTJG experienced underages as low as 
120 too few individuals for a period of two years.  LCDR underages remained relatively 
constant, between approximately 20 to 50 individuals.  These trends are exactly the same as 
those observed in the base case.   
Since the underages in LTJG became large, in the next iteration we limited the model to 
having underages of at most 100 individuals in any rank and allowed the number of recruits to 
be unconstrained (Option #2, Table 6).  The best solutions in this case recruited approximately 
330 individuals and caused an imbalance of ~1,860.  This handled the underages, but caused 
overages to increase with ENS having more that 300 excess spots by 2009 and LT overages no 
longer declining. 
In the next set of runs, we removed the constraints on the total number of recruits and 
underages (Option #3, Table 6).  In these runs, approximately 160 recruits were brought in 
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each year and the total imbalance decreased to ~1,120.  Again, there were many different 
combinations that permitted the model to achieve a similar level of overall imbalance.  Each of 
the results however, tended to achieve the better performance by addressing the overages at the 
expense of increasing the number of underages, allowing LTJG underages to be greater than 
200.   
Running the model without constraints on the number of recruits, but limiting the 
amount of underages to at most 150 in any rank (Option #4, Table 6), generated several 
solutions bringing in approximately 210 recruits and having an imbalance of 1,380.  This is an 
improvement of ~100 individuals over the case of bringing in 250 recruits each year.   
Allowing the model to change the number of new recruits each year gave similar results 
to Option #3.  Since the benefits were so small, this option is likely not to be worth the 
administrative and planning efforts it would require. 
Finally, the model was run without constraints on the number of recruits or the number 
of underages, but allowing the ranks of the recruits brought in by Recall or Direct Accession to 
be different (Option #5, Table 6).  Recall and Direct Accession are the only two accession 
sources that can bring in more senior nurses into the Nurse corps.  Direct Accession can bring 
in nurses with ranks up to lieutenant and Recall can bring in nurses with ranks up to lieutenant 
commander.  Allowing the percentage that are brought in at each rank to change, the model 
was able to lower the imbalance to ~515, an approximately 65% decrease from the baseline.  In 
this scenario, the solutions brought in ~ 235 recruits, with approximately 82 LTJG and 13 
LCDR.  Direct No Bonus was set to bring in only LTJGs.  Direct with Bonus brought in 
between 80% to 100% LTJGs, with the remainder being ENS.  Recall brought in 
approximately 75% LCDR and 25% as LTJG.  The overages of the LTs was controlled to a 
steady point between 70 to 90 excess individuals, the underages for LTJG were lowered 
dramatically and growing at a very slow rate.  LCDR no longer experienced any underages. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Over the four year period, the difference between the planned imbalance (~1,500) and 
the best policies when 250 recruits are brought in (~1,470) are relatively small.  A 25% 
reduction in the overall imbalance can be obtained by recruiting only ~160 individuals, but this 
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causes underages in the rank structure that may not be acceptable.  Limiting the number of 
underages causes the number of recruits and the imbalances to increase again.  The most 
effective policy would be to use the Recall and Direct Accession sources to recruit individuals 
at higher grade levels than is currently the norm.  This results in a 65% reduction in total 
imbalances and ensures that neither overages nor underages are above ~90 spaces at any point 
in time.  Therefore, changes in accession sources and the entry grade ranks of recruits can lead 
to increased efficiency in manpower management. 
The Markov model demonstrated a pre-existing overage of LTs and an underage of 
LTJGs and LCDRs.  The shortage of LTJG can be directly traced to promotion rates of LTJG 
and ENS and the Nurse Corps end-strength requirements of each.  Specifically, by the end of 
their 2nd year, 99% of ENS have left their grade – of these 97% promote and 3% leave.   By the 
end of their 2nd year, 95% of LTJG have left their grade – of these 75% promote and 25% 
leave. LTs typically remain in their grade for 5 years before they are promoted, though many 
leave the service before that point.  Since ENS and LTJG are promoted in the same time frame 
and the rate of exiting ENS is negligible, the only way to avoid either overages in ENS or 
underages in LTJG is for the personnel requirements of the two grades to be equivalent.  
Historically, the requirements for LTJG are double that of ENS and out-year projections widen 
this gap.  Therefore, given current promotion policy and end-strength requirements, it will be 
impossible to balance these needs unless new recruits are brought in at the LTJG level.  This is 
possible if the Recall and Direct Accession sources can be more thoroughly targeted to these 
higher ranks.  
The pre-existing overage in LTs frequently decreases in the short term, as new recruits 
will take at least 4 years to enter this rank.  However, over the longer term, the overage in LTs 
will either remain constant at approximately 90 spaces (best case) or may even start to 
increase.  Given the long time period for promotion, the exit rates, while frequently 10% to 
25% of a given year’s cohort, are not sufficient to prevent pressure to build on this grade level.  
Overages of LTs could potentially be redistributed to LTJG and LCDR by slowing the 
promotion rate to LT and increasing the promotion rate to LCDR.  However, any changes of 
this type would require an in-depth policy review. 
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The rank of LCDR seems to be experiencing a chronic low level shortage in the near 
term.  Except for recruiting directly into that rank, the model does not allow much change to 
this shortage due the long time it takes to progress to this level.  If the shortages are indeed 
present, it would make more sense to promote from the existing surplus of LTs rather than 
hiring in from the outside.  While a change in the promotion rate itself is possible, it may also 
be possible to simply promote to fill the vacancies.  As this is the current official position, we 
question whether the observed vacancies are real or whether there have been some other 
decisions made in regards to this rank.  Since so few members of this rank are part of the 
database, there is a potential for data error as well. 
This study was limited by sample size, both in term of the multivariate regression and 
in terms of the Markov models.  We were restricted to conducting only 10 regressions.  In 
addition, the Markov model could only include the ranks ENS through LCDR.  Even so, there 
were a number of rank/year in rank combinations that were sparsely populated and for which 
the promotion and retention rates could fluctuate.   
The Markov model uses static promotion rates based on historical trends.  Therefore, 
this model is limited to the extent that these past rates hold in the future.  In addition, the model 
currently precludes changing promotion and retention rates as a force shaping tool. These 
decisions have wide ranging policy implications beyond the NC itself.   Nurse Corps end-
strength targets are only projections.  Optimal distribution of both accession source and rank 
are dependant upon the degree of acceptable deviation from these targets.  The degree of 
acceptable deviation is difficult to determine and changes with operational tempo over time. 
Finally, recruiting decisions by accession source have been made without regards to 
their costs.  As shown in Table 1, there are different costs for recruiting/training nurse for the 
Navy Nurse Corps and an option for future studies would be to examine the cost-effectiveness 
of each of the recruiting options in tandem with their impact on the force structure.   
Changes in the mix of accession sources are not sufficient to resolve the underlying 
issues that cause pressure at certain grades nor the series of both overages and underages 
observed within all of the ranks. While accession sources do have a statistically significant 
effect on promotion and retention rates, these differences are not practically significant in a 
Markov model.  Small improvements are possible, but policies adjusting promotion and 
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retention rates (i.e. the transition probabilities) would have a much greater effect and 
potentially handle some of the underlying issues.  Policy changes should only be attempted 
after it has been ensured that the desired end-strengths of each rank are correct.  Modeling to 
improve manpower management may enable the Navy Nurse Corps to more efficiently fulfill 
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Table 1:  Summary of Accession Sources 
Accession Source [6,19] Background Service Obligation Cost of Nurse Corps Officer [6] 
Naval Reserve Officer 
Training Corps 
(NROTC)  
Started FY 1992 
NC community manager sets quotas 
Chief of Naval Education and Training and 
the Naval School of Health Sciences 
manage the program 
 4 years active duty service 
obligation; total commitment of 8 





Started FY 1992 
NC community manager sets quotas 
Naval School of Health Sciences manages the 
program 
4 years active duty service 
obligation; total commitment of 8 





Started FY 1993 
NC community manager sets quotas 
Naval School of Health Sciences manages the 
program 
If require 1 year to complete BSN 
then 4 years active duty service 
obligation; total commitment of 8 
years military service 
 
If require 2 years to complete BSN 
then 5 years active duty service 
obligation; total commitment of 8 
years military service 
$30,045 
Seaman to Admiral 
(STA)-21 
Started FY 2004 
NC community manager sets quotas 
4 years active duty service 
obligation; total commitment of 8 
years military service 
$74,781 plus up 
to $10,000 per 
school year 
Direct Accessions Primary supplement to training pipeline NC 
community manager sets quotas 
Chief Naval Recruiting Command manages 
the program 
If bonus not selected then 3 years 
active duty service obligation; 









If bonus is selected then 4 years 
active duty service obligation; 
total commitment of 8 years 
military service 
$13,145 
Recalls Supplement to training pipeline. 
Eligible candidates for recall drawn from the 
Naval Reserve Force 
Must be able to complete 20 years 
of service before age 55 
$10,275 
Full Time Out Service 
Training 
(FTOST) 
No longer active – last recruit in 1993 
Originally a supplement to pipeline 
36 months of service required for 
the first year and 6 months for 






No longer active – last recruit in 1992 
Originally part of regular accession pathways 
4 years active duty service 
obligation; total commitment of 8 






Table 2 . Distribution of Accession Sources by Rank (1997-2001) 




MECP NCP FTOST Recall
ENS 35% 6% 13% 22% 23% 0% 0% 
LTJG 30% 6% 26% 19% 18% 0% 1% 
LT 12% 9% 33% 30% 10% 2% 3% 
LCDR 0% 11% 36% 6% 0% 8% 39% 
 
 
Table 3.  Distribution of New Accessions by Rank  
 
        
 ROTC MECP NCP STA-21 Direct Direct Recall 
         (no bonus) (with bonus)   
ENS 100% 100% 95% 100% 80% 80%  
LTJG   5%  15% 15% 30% 
LT      5% 5% 65% 
LCDR       5% 
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Table 4. Likelihood Estimates for Significant Variables 
 
 Leave A  Promote B 




















N 827 1977 1880 1493 1154  2771 549 2623 827 595 
Direct, No B    1.41 *  1.24 *   -1.01 **  -0.59 **   
Direct B -1.51 *  0.98 **  0.73 *    -0.90 **    0.80 *  
BDCP -2.96 **  1.59 **  2.00 *  1.26 **      -0.89 *  
NCP    1.02 **    -0.76 **  -0.50 **   
FTOST      2.62 *  -1.35 *  2.62 *    
MECP          0.38 *   
Recall -3.89 **        -0.72 *  1.88 *  
Male   -0.57 * -0.83 *   -0.22 *  -0.23 *  -0.50 * 
White   -1.74 *     0.41 **    0.65 * 
Active SP  -1.61 **        0.52 **  1.93 **  
Master           1.03 ** 
Diploma           -0.87 * 
Critical  -0.49 * -0.43 **       0.43 **  0.74 **  
Unempl  0.74 **  0.35 *  0.51 **  0.42 *  0.67 *   0.12 *   0.67 * -0.13 * -0.27 * -1.24 ** 
Dependents -4.53 ** -2.32 ** -3.55 ** -2.70 ** -3.86 **  -0.11 * -3.86 **  0.15 **  1.01** 0.27 ** 
Married   -1.12 *  -3.16 **   -3.15 **    
Entry Age        0.05 **    0.03 * 
% Correctly  
Classified 
83% 75-80% 60% 86% 91%  56% 79% 56% 79% 65% 
A   A negative coefficient indicates that individuals are less likely to leave 
B   A negative coefficient indicates that individuals are less likely to be promoted 
*   Significant at the 0.05 level, two-tailed test 
** Significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed test
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Table 5.   Model Validation 
 
Year Paygrade Difference 
2001 ENS +  5 
 LTJG +29 
 LT +12 
 LCDR - 12 
 Total +34 
{(2683-2649)/2649}*100 = 1.3                    
Over predicted 2002 end strength by 1.2% 
   
2002 ENS +33 
 LTJG - 14 
 LT - 18 
 LCDR -  8 
 Total -  7 
{(2640-2647)/2647}*100 = 0.3                   
Under predicted 2002 end strength by 0.3% 
   
2003 ENS +15 
 LTJG -  3 
 LT +80 
 LCDR - 25 
 Total +67 
{(2659-2592)/2592}*100 = 2.6                     
Over predicted 2002 end strength by 2.6% 
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Baseline Current practice 1500 250 
Option #1 250 Recruits 1470 250 
Option #2 No constraint on Recruits 
Underages ≤100 1860 330 
Option #3 No constraint on Recruits 1120 160 
Option #4 No constraint on Recruits 
Underages ≤150 1380 211 
Option #5 No constraint on Recruits 
Rank at entry variable 515 235 
 
